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ABUSES: CHINA'S BID FOR THE 2000 
OLYMPICS 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Peng Yuzhang is a seventy year-old dissident professor who was 
handcuffed to a wooden shackle board by Chinese authorities for three 
months. Four small stumps supported the board and a hole was cut 
out for bodily functions. Government authorities later forcibly commit-
ted Yuzhang to an asylum. In February 1993, Human Rights Watch! 
chairman Robert Bernstein sent a letter to the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC) describing Yuzhang's plight. Bernstein wrote, 
"[h]olding the Olympics in a country known for imprisonment for the 
mere expression of ideas and [for] torture flies in the face of the 
Olympic spirit." The IOC responded curtly that Bernstein's comments 
were "duly noted."2 
China's bid to host the 2000 Summer Olympic Games in the city 
of Beijing was one of the most contentious Olympics site selection 
processes ever.3 On September 24, 1993, the IOC awarded Sydney, 
Australia the honor of being the host city for the 2000 Olympics by a 
narrow 45 to 43 vote over Beijing, China.4 But the Beijing 2000 con-
troversy had prompted an international debate on the role of Olympic 
site selection in international affairs that the world can expect to 
encounter again in the selection of the host city for the 2004 Games. 
* TOPICS EDITOR, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAw JOURNAL 
1 America's largest human rights advocacy organization, which opposed China's bid for the 
2000 Olympic Games. Bert Roughton Jr., Chinese Bid for Games Puts IOC on the Spot, ATLANTA]. 
AND CONsT.,June 21,1993, at AI. 
2 Steve Fainaru, Games Enhance Value; What Happens to Values?, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, 
Sept. 26, 1993, at 81. 
3 Dave Todd, Olympic Bid; 'Lack' of Dissidents Makes Beijing Ideal Games Site, Chinese Argue, 
THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, June 22,1993, at AI. 
4 E.g., Maggie Farley, China s Rights Record Couldn't Escape Olympic Considerations, BOSTON 
SUNDAY GLOBE, Sept. 26, 1993, at 6. 
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The United States Government officially expressed its opposition 
to Beijing hosting the 2000 Olympics in congressional resolutions 
adopted in June 1993.5 The resolutions opposed China's bid on human 
rights grounds and urged the IOC to overcome its indifference to 
human rights abuses and to find a more suitable venue for the Games.6 
IOC officials and others have criticized the United States' position as 
political interference with sports. 7 
This Note evaluates the legitimacy and appropriateness of the 
United States position with regard to China as expressed by the con-
gressional resolutions of 1993. It advocates that there is authority for 
the Olympic MovementS to use the power of international sport as 
leverage in the political world at the urging of a member nation. The 
Note argues that United States opposition to a nation's Olympic bid 
on human rights grounds is consistent with the Olympic ideal, and is 
justified by the custom of international sports law9 and by the historical 
precedent of the Olympics as a political forum. Part II provides an 
overview of the Olympic organization and its mission, goals, and ideal 
as embodied in the Olympic Charter. Part III sets out the continually 
developing legal framework of international sport, and shows that the 
Olympic Charter governs the actions of nation-states in the interna-
tional sports arena. Part III also describes the authority of the Amateur 
Sport Act of 1978, its effect on sports disputes within the United States, 
and its role in defining the United States Government's options for 
using sports as an instrument of foreign policy. Part IV discusses the 
political aspect of international sport from an historical perspective 
and demonstrates that world politics is inherently intertwined with the 
Olympic system. Part V analyzes China's goals in seeking to host the 
Olympic Games, and addresses whether human rights abuses should 
preclude a nation from being an Olympic host. Finally, Part VI exam-
ines the validity of United States opposition to China's bid in terms of 
international sports law and custom, and concludes that the United 
States has authority under customary international sports law to use 
5 S. Res. 124, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. Res. 117, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
6Id. 
7 Roughton, supra note 1, at AI. 
8 The Olympic Movement is the network of nongovernmental international sports organiza-
tions, primarily governed by the IOC, which programs competition among athletes and serves as 
a catalyst for developing international sports law. JAMES A.R. NAFZIGER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS 
LAW 2 (1988). 
9 "International sports law" is defined as a more or less distinctive body of rules, principles, 
and procedures that govern the political and social consequences of transnational sport activity. 
Id. at 1. 
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sport for legitimate political ends with regard to China because the 
motivation is the pursuit of a proper human rights objective. 
II. THE OLYMPIC ORGANIZATION 
A. General Organization 
The International Olympic System is comprised of a network of 
international and national sports committees and federations that 
work together to regulate and coordinate the Olympic Games and 
other regional amateur games. lO These organizations pursue a continu-
ous program of planning, supervising, and regulating sports activity, 
culminating in the celebrated quadrennial competitions.u The central 
organ of the Olympic System is the IOC, which enforces the Olympic 
Charter12 and is the supreme authority13 on all questions concerning 
the Olympic Games.14 Other components of the Olympic System in-
clude International Federations (IFs), National Olympic Committees 
(NOCs), the Olympic Congress, organizing committees for particular 
Olympiads, and national and local governments.15 These organizations 
function generally within the framework of the United Nations Charter 
and are part of the international legal system.16 
B. The International Olympic Committee 
The IOC is a corporate entity which owns the rights to the Olym-
pic GamesP The IOC is fundamentally responsible for encouraging 
international athletic competition and organizing a regular celebra-
tion of the Olympic Games in different locations while ensuring the 
10 See Barbara O'Neill, Comment, International Sports: Have States Succeeded Athletes as the 
Players?, 6 DICK.]. INT'L L. 403, 406 (1988). 
11 James A.R. Nafziger, International Sports Law: A Replay of Characteristics and Trends, 86 
AM.]. INT'L L. 489, 491 (1992) [hereinafter Nafziger, Characteristics]. 
12 ''The Olympic Charter is the codification of the Fundamental Principles, Rules, and 
Bye-laws adopted by the IOC. It governs the organization and operation of the Olympic Move-
ment and stipulates the conditions for the celebration of the Olympic Games." OLYMPIC CHARTER 
art. I, rule 8. 
13 OLYMPIC CHARTER art. I, rule 4. "Every person or organization that plays any part what-
soever in the Olympic Movement shall accept the supreme authority of the IOC and shall be 
bound by its Rules and submit to its jurisdiction." Id. 
HO'Neill, supra note 10, at 407. 
15 NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 25-26. 
16Id. at 25. The Olympic organizations are part of the Olympic system in the sense that their 
decisions and practices constitute customary international law that is generally followed by 
nation-states. Id. at 35. 
17 O'Neill, supra note 10, at 407; NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 26. 
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proper respect for and interpretation of the Olympic Charter.IS Spe-
cifically, the IOC creates and applies rules and regulations regarding 
all aspects of the Games, elects its own officers and committee chairs, 
determines the qualifications of Olympic participants, and selects sites 
for the Olympic Games. I9 Media payments and gate receipts at the 
Games are its primary sources of revenue.20 
The IOC is a non-governmental body consisting of ninety-three 
individuals. The IOC body selects an individual member for each 
member nation.21 The IOC does not consider its individual members 
representatives of their nation-states.22 They are "ambassadors of the 
Olympic ideal" to their homelands.23 The goal is to have disinterested 
members who remain free from any governmental or organizational 
ties that could influence their decisions.24 IOC members are repre-
sentatives of and not to the IOC.25 
C. Goals of the Olympic Movement 
The mission of the Olympic Movement is to further the Olympic 
ideal in the forum of international sports competition.26 The predomi-
nant articulation of this ideal and of international sport in general 
appears in the Olympic Charter.27 
The aims of the Olympic Movement are: 
- to promote the development of those physical and moral 
qualities which are the basis of sport, 
- to educate young people through sport in a spirit of better 
understanding between each other and of friendship, thereby 
helping to build a better and more peaceful world, 
- to spread the Olympic principles throughout the world, 
thereby creating international goodwill, 
18 NAFZIGER, supra note B, at 19. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 27. Beijing expected to bring in approximately $1.14 billion in revenue for the 2000 
Games, and earn a profit of$120 million. Television rights alone were budgeted to bring in $500 
million in revenue. Lena H. Sun, China PUUS Out Stops in Olympic Bid; Political Factors Dominate 
in Beijing Try for 2000 Games, With Chances Uncertain, WASH. POST,July 15,1993, at D1. 
21 OLYMPIC CHARTER art. II, rule 12. 
22 O'Neill, supra note 10, at 407. 
23 Id. (citation omitted). 
24 See id. at 407--OB. 
25 NAFZIGER, supra note B, at 26. The Olympic Charter states: "Members of the IOC are 
representatives of the IOC in their countries and not their delegates to the IOC.· OLYMPIC 
CHARTER art. II, rule 12. 
26 SeeJeffrey M. Marks, Note, Political Abuse of Olympic sport: DeFrantz v. United States Olympic 
Committee, 14 N.V.D. J. INT'L L. & POL. 155, 158-59 (19Bl). 
27 NAFZIGER, supra note B, at 44. 
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- to bring together the athletes of the world III the great 
four-yearly sport festival, the Olympic Games.28 
145 
As the enforcer of the Olympic Charter, the lOC's role is to 
promote the underlying goals of the Olympic Movement as set out in 
the Charter.29 Thus, all lOC decisions must be in furtherance of the 
Olympic ideal of seeking a better and more peaceful world. 
D. Olympic Venue Site Selection Process 
One of the most important lOC decisions is selection of the site 
for each Olympiad. The Olympic venue site selection process involves 
a detailed study, which evaluates a wide variety of factors for prospective 
host cities. Representatives of bidding cities submit proposals through 
the NOC of the nation to the lOC, and the lOC works closely with the 
NOCs in choosing host cities and nations.30 
The representatives of the bidding city must answer an lOC ques-
tionnaire in order to be considered as host for the Games.31 The 
fifty-two questions address issues such as respect for lOC rules, general 
and cultural information, organizational matters, and electronic media 
issues.32 Mter the lOC eliminates most cities based on their answers to 
the first questionnaire, the lOC examines the remaining cities in 
greater detail with more difficult and specific inquiries in order to 
narrow the pool of host contenders for the Games.33 During this proc-
ess, the lOC consults closely with the NOCs and conducts fact-finding 
missions to cities competing to host the Games.34 Additional factors 
that the lOC evaluates during the process include security, tourist 
offerings, and political involvements of the city or state.35 The lOC then 
prepares a report for its ninety-three individual voting members. The 
lOC report does not attempt to recommend or rank the host cities. 
Rather, the report evaluates each city on twenty-three themes, ranging 
from meteorological conditions to sports experience.36 Although the 
lOC report makes no reference to human rights issues, Anita DeFrantz, 
28 OLYMPIC CHARTER art. I, rule l. 
29 See O'Neill, supra note 10, at 407. 
30 Id. at 409. 
31Id. 
32Id. 
33Id. 
34NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 13l. 
35 O'Neill, supra note 10, at 409. 
36Janice Lioyd, IOC RepMt Doesn't Bode WeU FM Beijing Bid as Host in 2000, USA TODAY, 
July 13, 1993, at 12C. 
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the American member of the IOC that chose the 2000 Olympiad site, 
has indicated that the committee seriously considers human rights 
arguments.37 
All IOC actions inevitably project and reflect the Olympic ideal. 
The selection of the Olympic host site is the primary IOC decision that 
communicates that ideal to the world. Just the mention of an Olympic 
host city often conjures a vivid image. For example, a reference to 
Munich, Sarajevo, Berlin, or Lake Placid can each portray a unique 
version of the Olympic ideal. It is imperative to understand, therefore, 
how the Olympic organization operates and makes its decisions. Ac-
cordingly, the legal framework within which it exists must be examined. 
III. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL SPORT 
A. The Olympic Charter 
Athletic competition is a fundamental human activity that has 
spawned a multitude of international problems when inserted into the 
context of rival nation-states.38 As the problems multiplied and mag-
nified throughout the years, the Olympic system formed a group of 
transnational sports organizations based on the Olympic Charter for 
the regulation of sport on an international scale.39 The Olympic Char-
ter provides a set of rules as a framework to reconcile the general 
practices of states with the shared goals of international sports compe-
tition.40 Many states have deferred to the rules of the Olympic Move-
37 It would be speculative to estimate just how much IOC members weigh a nation's human 
rights record when selecting an Olympic Games site. Although the IOC's Olympic site selection 
process does not expressly take the human rights record of the prospective nation into account, 
there are indications that human rights records influence the Committee. See Roughton, supra 
note I, at AI. "Ms. DeFrantz said the committee takes the human rights arguments seriously. 
[DeFrantz commented], • [blut the truth is, if we begin to exclude cities solely because of 
complaints about human rights violations, then there would be few countries where the Games 
could be held - including the United States.'" Id. Perhaps the IOC's unenthusiastic acknow-
ledgement of the Human Rights Watch appeal for Peng Yuzhang was more a smug response from 
a committee that is not receptive to outside opinion than a rejection of the human rights issue. 
38 See Nafziger, Characteristics, supra note II, at 489. These international problems, described 
in Part IV, infra, occur when sports competition between individual athletes results in confron-
tation between nations. See RICHARD Espy, THE POLITICS OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES 168 (1979). 
39 See Espy, supra note 38, at 167. 
40 NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 71. The Rules of the Olympic Charter provide the IOC with 
the ability to bring together citizens of the various nations of the world in the spirit of interna-
tional goodwill, in spite of clashing political ideologies and individual foreign policy agendas. See 
Espy, supra note 38, at 168. 
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ment to define a developing, but influential and growing body of 
international sports lawY 
The rules of the Olympic Charter and the decisions based on it 
constitute international custom that governs the actions of states and 
other actors with regard to disputes of international legal significance 
in sports competition.42 States normally adhere to the rules and prac-
tices of the Olympic legal framework and related authority as a matter 
of respect and reciprocal obligation.43 A government risks rebuke and 
isolation if it bases decisions regarding international sports disputes on 
principles other than those of the international system of comity and 
reciprocity.44 Because custom is itself a source of international law, and 
the Olympic Charter best evidences custom pertaining to international 
sports competition, the Olympic Charter therefore sets the legal pa-
rameters for governmental action relating to the Olympic Games.45 
B. Role of the United Nations 
As the Olympic Movement and international sport grew in interest 
and prestige, tension between nation-states was manifested more often 
on the field of play.46 The constant challenges to the international 
Olympic organization of managing a worldwide amateur sports system 
in the context of independent nation-states (often with contrary politi-
cal agendas) eventually drew the Olympics into the United Nations 
fold.47 The United Nations' recognition of the Olympic Charter sup-
ports the premise that the Charter is a source of internationallaw.48 
In 1982 the IOC adopted a Draft Declaration49 that confirmed 
fundamental rules and principles of international sports law within the 
41 NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 35. 
42Id. 
43Id. 34. Customary adherence to the Olympic Charter is widespread but undoubtedly not 
without exceptions. As Part IV of this Note explains, the modern Olympic Games are rife with 
various types of political disputes in which the world community has often operated outside the 
authority of customary international sports law. The drama of East-West boycotts and divided 
nation issues have been prominent in the last 25 years. See infra notes 91-129 and accompanying 
text. 
44 NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 63. 
45Id. at 105. 
46EsPY, supra note 38, at 167. 
47 See id. at 168. 
48 The IOC is registered with the United Nations as a recognized international organization 
having legal status. Id. at 167. Thus, the Rules of the Olympic Charter, promulgated by the IOC, 
have become a source of international law. Id. 
49 NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 135. The preamble of the Declaration expresses the desire to 
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United Nations framework.50 The intent was to constrain governments 
by explicitly stating that the rules of the Olympic Charter constitute 
international law.51 The IOC selected the United Nations General 
Assembly rather than some other specialized forum because it recog-
nized that there would often be political disputes related to the Olym-
pics.52 In fact, the United Nations has been a primary actor in pressur-
ing the IOC and international governments for action in several 
political and human rights controversies.53 
C. Legal Role and Responsibilities of the International Olympic 
Committee 
Despite its nongovernmental status, the IOC has been vested with 
substantial legal authority by virtue of the Olympic Charter. 54 The IOC 
is "a body corporate by international law having juridical status and 
perpetual succession. "55 The IOC is also "the final authority on all 
questions concerning the Olympic Games and the Olympic Move-
ment."56 The rules and regulations of the IOC and United Nations 
authority together provide the crux of the law governing sport in the 
international context. 57 Being a nongovernmental organization, the 
IOC cannot compel governmental obedience.58 Nevertheless, its rules 
and regulations best evidence current international practice and there-
fore have authority as customary law. 59 IOC rules are authoritative 
when they do not conflict with international legislation, and when they 
protect competition "from the adverse consequences of international tensions." The actual 
Declaration provides for: 1) recognition and protection by states of the Olympic Games, 2) 
freedom of access for athletes and officials to Olympic sites, 3) nondiscrimination other than to 
further the aims of the Olympic Movement, and 4) respect by states for their National Olympic 
Committees. Id. 
50Id. Although the United Nations has not formally adopted the IOC Declaration, its 
recognition of the IOC as an international organization having legal status confers a level of 
international legal authority upon the IOC. See Espy, supra note 38, at 168. 
51 NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 135. 
52 See id. 
53 Espy, supra note 38, at 167. For example, the United Nations sought to utilize international 
sport to bring attention to the injustice of apartheid in South Africa. See infra notes 138-146 and 
accompanying text. 
54 Marks, supra note 26, at 162. 
55 OLYMPIC CHARTER art. II, rule 11. 
56 OLYMPIC CHARTER art. II, rule 23. 
57 James A.R. Nafziger & Andrew Strenk, The Political Uses and Abuses of Sports, 10 CONN. L. 
REv. 259, 279 (1978). 
58 NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 34. 
59Id. 
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perform a quasi-judicial function by implementing United Nations 
law. 50 Although the IOC cannot by itself generate public international 
law, states have recognized its autonomy as an implied delegation of 
governmental functions in sport.61 
The IOC's record as a forum for international sports dispute 
resolution is mixed. Whereas legal authority of the IOC and other 
Olympic governing bodies has demonstrated an ability to resolve tech-
nical disputes, historically the IOC has been ineffective in utilizing 
international sports law to bring order to political disputes between 
national governments that affect their Olympic athletes.62 For example, 
events such as the United States boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics 
and the retaliatory Soviet boycott of the 1984 Los Angeles Games 
suggest that the international community is not wholly obedient to the 
IOC when political issues drive the dispute.63 However, the IOC, NOCs, 
and IFs routinely settle non-political controversies such as "technical" 
issues of drug testing, eligibility, and time-keeping.64 
The IOC exercises its authority to provide for the settlement of 
disputes through the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), established 
in 1983.65 Although the subject matter jurisdiction of the CAS is limited 
to private sports issues rather than matters of diplomacy, it has all the 
powers of an international court of arbitration.66 Its judgments are 
binding and as such add substantial credibility to the legal authority 
of the Olympic organization.67 The competence of the CAS to settle 
international disputes suggests a legitimate source of principles and 
norms in the development of international sports law.68 
60Nafziger & Strenk, supra note 57, at 280. The role of the IOC is similar to that of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, which has achieved status as a special subject of 
international law. Id. 
61 Nafziger, Characteristics, supra note 11, at 494 n.19 (citation omitted). 
62 See Michael Dockterman, The Evolving Antarctic Legal Regime: International Sports Law, 83 
AM. J. INT'L L. 690, 693 (1988) (reviewing JAMES A.R. NAFZIGER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAw 
(1988». 
63 Id. at 692. 
64 See NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 35. For example, the highly controversial issue of the 
eligibility of United States figure skater Tonya Harding for the 1994 Lillehammer, Norway Winter 
Olympics was decided within the Olympic system by the United States Figure Skating Association, 
the United States Olympic Committee, and ultimately the IOC. 
65 See id. 
66 Id. at 36. 
67Id. "Although its jurisdiction is optional-the parties must agree in writing to submit a 
matter to the CAS-its judgements are binding .... Swiss law applies unless a particular arbitra-
tion agreement provides otherwise." Id. 
68 Id. at 37. 
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D. United States Acceptance of IOC Legal Authority 
The United States and many other countries have recognized the 
unique legal personality of the IOC and the legal importance of the 
Olympic Charter.6g This recognition comes in the form of legislation 
and judicial opinions that formulate the general national sports policy 
in international relations.70 In Martin v. International Olympic Commit-
tee,n the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit confir-
med the special status of the Olympic Charter and the Olympic Games 
under international law.72 The Martin court stated: "The Olympic 
Games are organized and conducted under the terms of an interna-
tional agreement-the Olympic Charter. We are extremely hesitant to 
undertake the application of one state's statute to alter an event that 
is staged with competitors from the entire world under the terms of 
that agreement."73 
The United States Supreme Court also recognized the legitimacy 
of IOC legal authority in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. USOC 
& IOG.74 The Supreme Court established that although the USOC is 
not a formal government actor, Congress officially adopted the aim of 
the Olympic Charter.75 The aim described in Rule One of the Olympic 
Charter, adopted by the United States Government, is "to spread the 
Olympic principles."76 In addition, the dissenting Justices qualified the 
IOC as "a highly visible and influential international body."77 
The Amateur Sport Act of 197878 is further evidence of acceptance 
by the United States of the general legal authority of the IOC. The Act 
69 Id. at 34. 
70Id. 
71 740 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1984). In this case, women runners filed for injunctive relief in 
California state court to require organizers of the 1984 Los Angeles Summer Olympics to include 
certain track events for women. The women runners claimed that the failure to include these 
events was gender-based discrimination that violated their equal protection rights under a Cali-
fornia state civil rights statute. The court held that the California statute did not compel separate 
but equal Olympic events for women, reasoning that a state statute should not be applied to alter 
the content of the Olympic Games. Id. at 677. 
72 NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 34; see generally Martin, 740 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1984). 
73 Martin, 740 F.2d at 677. 
74 483 U.S. 522 (1987). The USOC and IOC brought suit under the AnIateur Sports Act 
against a California corporation to restrain its use of the term "Olympics" to describe an athletic 
competition the company sponsored. The United States Supreme Court ruled for the USOC and 
IOC, holding that the First AnIendment did not prohibit Congress's grant to the USOC of 
exclusive use of the word "Olympic." Id. at 534-35. 
75 NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 34. 
76 San Francisco Arts, 483 U.S. at 537. 
77 Id. at 550. 
78 36 U.S.C. §§ 371-396 (1988) [hereinafter, "Act"]. 
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largely defines the scope and nature of involvement by the federal 
government in sport and establishes the United States Olympic Com-
mittee (USOC) as the instrument to manage amateur athletic activities 
of the United States with foreign nations.79 The Act applies the rules 
and procedures of the Olympic Movement to purely domestic compe-
tition as well.80 In defining the Government's policy options and re-
lated private options for the use of sport as an instrument of foreign 
policy, the Act states that the USOC shall "exercise exclusive jurisdic-
tion . . . over all matters pertaining to the participation of the United 
States in the Olympic Games .... "81 This provision, however, cannot 
constrain federal action that is otherwise legitimate.82 Other federal 
statutes that involve international relations, such as the Export Admini-
stration Act of 197983 or the International Emergency Economic Pow-
ers Act,84 may justify United States government action affecting inter-
national sport.85 
In summary, an institutional framework for the regulation of sport 
exists on an international scale. This framework is based on the Olym-
pic Charter as an international agreement, sanctioned by the United 
Nations, and enforced by the IOC. International sports law constrains 
the policy options of nations maneuvering in the world political arena 
to the extent that they respect international custom and comity. The 
IOC promulgates rules and regulations that are authoritative as long 
as they do not conflict with international legislation.86 Just as IOC 
members, who serve in a private capacity and are not national repre-
sentatives, are not allowed to accept instructions from any government, 
neither can they compel action on the part of any government.87 But 
the IOC is still of a high legal order for nongovernmental organiza-
tions. It engages in significant diplomatic activity and serves an impor-
tant function in intergovernmental affairs.88 Therefore, although the 
79 NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 57; The Act specifically refers to U.S. involvement in the 
Olympic and Pan-American Games. 36 U.S.C. § 374(3) (1988). 
8oNafziger, Characteristics, supra note 11, at 492. 
81 36 U.S.C. § 374(3) (1988). The Act does not define the terms "exclusive jurisdiction" or 
"participation." See id. at § 373(1)-(7). 
82 NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 58. 
83 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-20 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
84 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06 (Supp. IV 1980). 
85 NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 126-27. President Carter invoked these laws to institute eco-
nomic sanctions against the Soviet Union in response to its invasion of Mghanistan. The United 
States boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics became part of the package of sanctions justified by 
these statutes. Id. 
86 Nafziger & Strenk, supra note 57, at 280. 
87 Marks, supra note 26, at 163. 
88 Nafziger & Strenk, supra note 57, at 280. 
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nongovernmental bodies of the Olympic organization cannot alone 
compel government compliance, their rules, regulations, and deci-
sions help determine state practice and best articulate a customary or 
autonomous sports law.89 
IV. HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL SPORT 
A. General Overview 
Baron Pierre de Coubertin, the father of the modern Olympic 
Games, envisioned international sporting events untouched by politi-
cal currents.90 The reality is that de Coubertin's idealistic vision was 
hopelessly inaccurate. International sports and politics are inextricably 
intertwined.91 The relationship between sports and politics originated 
with ideas of nationalism that the IOC and the individual competing 
states promoted and the media magnified. The Olympic system con-
tains an inherent paradox in that the IOC rules state that the Games 
are contests between individuals, yet athletes represent their respective 
states.92 The result is that nationalistic fervor makes the Olympics a 
forum for international competition and nations historically have used 
the Games as tools of national foreign policy.93 The international sports 
arena has therefore been a political arena since the time of the ancient 
Greeks.94 
89 Nafziger, Characteristics, supra note 11, at 491. 
90 NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 49. Baron de Coubertin created the IOC in 1896 and promoted 
the idea of an ambulatory quadrennial athletic competition around the world, establishing the 
concept of the Olympic Games as it is today. Id. at 19. 
91 O'Neill, supra note 10, at 412. 
92 Id. at 413. 
93 Espy, supra note 38, at 164. Espy notes: 
In this sense, organizations are individual units on the world scene. When an 
organization structures itself in terms of other organizational entities (e.g., inter-
national sport in terms of nation-states), the facets of other organizations (the 
nation-state) become a part of the first organization (international sport). Since 
politics is a facet of nation-states, politics becomes a part of international sport. The 
only way to divorce politics from international sport is to alter the organizational 
structure of sport. Id. 
94 O'Neill, supra note 10, at 413 n.71. "Solon, the archon of Athens in the early 6th century 
BC [sic], legislated a reward of 500 drachmas for every Athenian who won at the ancient Olympics 
in an effort to increase Athens's image." Id. (quoting HA. HARRIS, GREEK ATHLETES AND 
ATHLETICS, noted in Leiper, Political Problems in the Olympic Games, in OLYMPISM, 115, 119 (J. 
Segrave and D. Chu eds. 1981). 
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B. The Objectives of Governmental Use of Sport in International 
Relations 
153 
The legitimacy of political use of sport depends upon the objective 
of the intervening government. Governments use or abuse sports com-
petition for any of at least seven objectives: propaganda, prestige, 
protest, conflict, cooperation, diplomatic recognition, and promotion 
of human rights or economic development.95 An analysis of political 
disputes in the modern history of the Olympics will demonstrate that 
there are acceptable governmental uses of sport that are consistent 
with international sports law, such as to improve human rights. Because 
international sports law is to a large extent based on custom, historical 
precedent is critical to the establishment of legal custom. 
1. Conflict 
The use of sports by a sovereign or an individual to provoke 
conflict is generally illegal according to international law as expressed 
by the United Nations Charter.96 Spontaneous or deliberate violent 
disturbances during high-visibility events such as the Olympic Games 
usually manifest conflict in sports. Deliberate instances of conflict in 
sports are normally based on propaganda.97 
The most infamous example of the political nature of sport and 
the violent conflicts it generates was the shocking "Black September" 
slaughter at the 1972 Summer Olympic Games in Munich. Palestinian 
terrorists infiltrated the Olympic Village, killing two Israeli athletes and 
taking nine hostage.98 The police ambushed the terrorists at the airport 
in their attempt to leave with the hostages. During the ambush, the 
terrorists killed the nine athletes and the police killed three terrorists.99 
This attempt to further Palestinian objectives, particularly to gain dip-
95 NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 71. 
96Id. at 71 n.l. Article 2 of the United Nations Charter provides that: 
(3) All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such 
a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. 
(4) All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or 
in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations. Id. at 71 
n.l. 
97 See id. at 73. 
98 E.g., Espy, supra note 38, at 14l. 
99 Id. 
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lomatic recognition, by staging a stunning violent propaganda coup at 
a major sporting event, is exactly the type of political statement that 
the IOC desperately wants to avoid. lOo Fortunately, violent conflict is 
not a major problem in international sport because such dramatic 
instances are rare.lO l 
Conflict in sport is more often spontaneous and not instigated by 
governments. For example, the rash of hooliganism and spectator 
rioting during European soccer matches in the mid-1980s was based 
in nationalistic fervor, but sovereign states did not sponsor or promote 
this conflict in any way.102 These examples of conflict, obviously not 
consistent with the Olympic ideal or in conformance with international 
law, demonstrate the link between nationalism, politics, and sport. 
They also demonstrate the weakness oflegal controls (an over-reliance 
on comity and judicial cooperation) and the anemic diplomatic power 
of the IOC to avoid political conflict in sport. 103 
2. Diplomatic Recognition and Nonrecognition 
International law does not condone the unilateral use of sport by 
a nation-state to express nonrecognition of states. International sports 
law does encourage the peaceful use of sport to establish diplomatic 
relations or recognize states.104 Issues of diplomatic recognition or 
nonrecognition have arisen whenever a governmental policy to ex-
clude athletes of a particular nationality has conflicted with Olympic 
rules.105 
In 1976, Canada refused to grant visas to athletes from Taiwan to 
participate in the Montreal Olympic Games because of its more 
friendly political relationship with China.106 Canada thereby violated 
Olympic rules and breached its promise as host country to admit all 
nations who had an IOC-approved NOC.l°7 The customary law of the 
Olympic Charter prohibits discrimination by states against "any coun-
try or person on grounds of race, religion, or politics."108 
The case of East Germany provides an example of legitimate 
political use of sport for diplomatic recognition. Before the IOC for-
100 See NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 73. 
101 See id. at 71-72. 
102 Nafziger, Characteristics, supra note 11, at 496. 
103Id. 
104 NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 90. 
105 Nafziger, Characteristics, supra note 11, at 497. 
1060'Neill, supra note 10, at 429-30. 
107Id. 
108 OLYMPIC CHARTER art. I, rule 3. 
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mally recognized East Germany, NATO member countries were re-
quired to prohibit entry of East German nationals. Mter IOC recogni-
tion of East Germany, host nations became obligated by Rule Three of 
the Olympic Charter to permit East German Olympic athletes to com-
pete. lOg Such waivers of visa requirements for athletes of unrecognized 
states under international sports law have helped to further Olympic 
ideals of international understanding, and have facilitated full diplo-
matic recognition of states. 
3. Cooperation 
Customary international sports law encourages the sovereign use 
of sports to foster international cooperation and harmony.llo Sports 
have been effectively utilized to improve strained diplomatic rela-
tions.11! The Chinese undertook a particularly skillful diplomatic pro-
gram utilizing the sport of table tennis-the so-called "ping-pong di-
plomacy."ll2 In 1971, after years of unproductive Cold War relations, 
the government of the People's Republic of China invited the United 
States table tennis team to visit China for a competition. The govern-
ment of the United States viewed the invitation as a signal of China's 
desire for better relations. ll3 The United States government accepted 
the invitation and officially proposed a reciprocal visit by Chinese 
players. Broader diplomatic initiatives, including President Nixon's 
acceptance of an invitation to visit China, and eventual exchange of 
diplomatic relations followedY4 In the case of "ping-pong diplomacy," 
international sports thus helped to create an atmosphere of interna-
tional goodwill, consistent with the Olympic ideal, which laid the foun-
dation for political recognition of China by the United States and the 
development of diplomatic relations on a nation-state level.lI5 
4. Prestige 
The Olympic Games also provide a high-profile forum at which a 
nation can earn substantial international prestige. Success in athletic 
1090'Neill, supra note 10, at 429. Rule 3 states: "No discrimination .. .is allowed against any 
country or person on grounds of race, religion or politics." OLYMPIC CHARTER art. I, rule 3. 
lIONAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 74. 
III Nafziger & Strenk, supra note 57, at 276. 
112 O'Neill, supra note 10, at 415-16. 
113 NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 74. The Chinese ultimately succeeded in generating an 
immense amount of favorable global opinion in a manner that helped both countries. Id. at 75. 
114Id. at 74. 
m O'Neill, supra note 10, at 416. 
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competition at the Olympic Games is a direct and certain route to 
international prestige for the nation that the achieving athletes repre-
sent. ll6 Hosting the Games can potentially provide a great amount of 
prestige by giving the host country a unique opportunity to convey to 
the world favorable impressions of its tourism, economic offerings, and 
system of governmen t. 117 The IOC views the sovereign use of sports to 
enhance national prestige as acceptable so long as it does not result in 
discrimination or a triumph of nationalism over the shared goals of 
international competition. liS 
5. Propaganda 
When an attempt to gain international prestige through sports 
becomes too closely linked with political ideology, it rises to the level 
of propaganda, and the apolitical nature of the Olympic Charter 
thereby prohibits it. 119 The use of sport as an instrument of propaganda 
began with Hitler and Nazi Germany, culminating in the Berlin Olym-
pics of 1936.120 In 1932, the award of the 1936 Olympics to Berlin 
helped to confirm Germany's re-entry into the mainstream of interna-
tional relations after World War 1.121 But when Hitler took power, he 
converted the use of the Berlin Games from an attempt to increase 
national prestige to the propaganda motive of promotion of Nazi 
ideology and of racial and religious bias. 122 Hitler exploited the politi-
cal and public relations possibilities of the Olympics to "stir his Aryan 
followers to new heights of frenzied and evil patriotism. "123 
6. Protest 
International sporting events have often been used as platforms 
for protest or criticism of the conduct or policies of a particular gov-
ernment.124 Protest may be individual or official,l25 An official protest, 
116Nafziger & Strenk, supra note 57, at 273. 
117 Id. For example, by hosting the 1964 Summer Olympics, Japan gained international 
prestige by "show[ingl the world that it was a modern, democratic, peaceful country and that 
the legacy of World War II had been buried." Id. 
liB NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 80. 
119Nafziger & Strenk, supra note 57, at 273. "Although the categories of propaganda and 
prestige may overlap, propaganda is used to glorify a particular political system, whereas interna-
tional prestige is more typically the culmination of a country's effort to show, for example, that 
it is a favorable vacation spot or economic partner." Id. 
120Id. at 271. 
121 NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 21. 
122Id. at 22. 
123Marks, supra note 26, at 161 (citation omitted). 
124Nafziger & Strenk, supra note 57, at 267. 
125 NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 97. At the 1968 Mexico City Olympic Games, two United States 
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initiated by a government, is more serious because it usually involves 
political issues that may spark international conflicts. 126 The legality of 
protests in sport depends upon the context in which it occurs, and 
which other uses of sport the protest invokes.127 For instance, if the 
protest is based on a propaganda motive, it would be considered an 
illegitimate use of international sport. 128 Protest intended to enhance 
human rights, however, may fall within the permissible bounds of the 
Olympic Charter.129 
7. Human Rights 
Another political use of sport is the application of the leverage of 
international athletic events to combat human rights problems in the 
international community.130 Although the Olympic Charter prohibits 
discrimination against any country or person on the grounds of race, 
religion, or politics,131 the issue of human rights abuses presents a 
conflict. The conflict is "between the obligation to promote and pro-
tect human rights, which is clearly an aspiration of the Olympic Move-
ment, and the customary rule against exclusion ... for political rea-
sons. "132 The IOC has been faced with the dilemma of whether to abide 
by the Olympic rules in a strict sense, which would prohibit any politi-
cal considerations from entering into Olympic decision-making, or to 
interpret the rules more liberally to evaluate human rights conditions 
as they relate to Olympic goals and ideals. 133 The growing body of 
international human rights law, including United Nations efforts to 
offer protection from human rights abuses during the 1970s, appears 
to have tipped the scale toward Olympic consciousness of human rights 
athletes made an act of individual protest. The athletes refused to face the American flag when 
it was raised during the award ceremony and raised their fists in a black power salute in protest 
of United States government policies. ld. 
126Nafziger & Strenk, supra note 57, at 283. 
127 See NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 98. 
128 The most common form of protest is the boycott. ld. Most of the national boycotts of the 
Olympic Games have been to protest the participation in or hosting of the Games by nations of 
an opposing political ideology. See generally id. at 101-37. This is an illegitimate use of sport for 
propaganda purposes. See Nafziger & Strenk, supra note 57, at 273. For example, the multina-
tional boycott of the 1980 Moscow Games and the Soviet boycott of the 1984 Los Angeles Games 
involved a clash between capitalist and communist ideologies. See NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 50. 
The East Germans boycotted the 1952 Games to protest the IOC's refusal to recognize East 
Germany as a separate country, an illegitimate act of sports protest invoking the issue of diplo-
matic recognition. ld. at 101. 
129 NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 98. 
1300'Neill, supra note 10, at 417. 
131 OLYMPIC CHARTER art. I, rule 3. 
132NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 81. 
1331d. 
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problems.134 Because the IOC must comply with United Nations man-
dates and with human rights law,135 the political use of international 
sports for protecting human rights is legitimate.136 
The modern history of the Olympics demonstrates that the Olym-
pic Movement has adopted the protection of human rights as a serious 
issue.137 The predominant example of the political use of sports to 
further human rights is the campaign to eradicate racial discrimination 
and apartheid in South Mrica.138 Under legal compulsion, the IOC 
generally excluded South Mrican athletes from Olympic competition 
between 1964 and 1991.139 The Olympic organization urged all Inter-
national Federations to exclude South Mrica from participation until 
it renounced its policy of apartheid, "which is in contravention of the 
Olympic Charter. "140 In doing so, the IOC rightly subordinated the 
Olympic goal of widespread international sports participation to the 
more fundamental principles of international human rights law. 141 
The use of international sport to effect changes in South Mrican 
government policy has been relatively successful. 142 The government of 
South Mrica puts a very high value on international sports competition 
and therefore is particularly sensitive to IOC measures.143 The IOC 
campaign against apartheid, prompted by segregation in South Mrican 
sports teams,144 was instrumental in compelling South Mrica to aban-
134 See Nafziger & Strenk, supra note 57, at 286. The IOC joined forces with the United 
Nations in the campaign to eradicate racial discrimination in South Mrica. Id. at 284; see also 
infra, notes 136--45, and accompanying text. In 1975, the United Nations General Assembly 
adopted a resolution urging all nations to boycott New Zealand's teams in the 1976 Olympics to 
protest New Zealand's competition with the South Mrican Rugby Team. Nafziger & Strenk, supra 
note 57, at 284. Such international pressures brought the battle for human rights into the forum 
of the Olympic Games. Id. at 285. 
135NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 81. 
136Nafziger & Strenk, supra note 57, at 286. 
137 O'Neill, supra note 10, at 420. 
138Id. 
139Nafziger, Characteristics, supra note 11, at 498. The IOC helped create the International 
Convention against Apartheid in Sports. Significantly, the decisions of this quintessential nongov-
ernmental organization, which was created under IOC authority, were adopted as a general 
practice of states. Id. 
140 NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 107 (quoting 1984 Mexico City Declaration of the NOCs). 
141 See id. at 108. "Apartheid and official racism violate fundamental human rights at one or 
another level of custom and positive law. Arguably, ... apartheid and official racism may conflict 
with peremptory norms of human rights from which no derogation is permitted .... " Id. 
142 O'Neill, supra note 10, at 421. 
143 NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 81. "Pressures exerted through sports competition to protect 
human rights in South Mrica are relatively significant because of the importance traditionally 
attached to athletics in South Mrica, whose government includes a Minister of Sport." Id. 
144 O'Neill, supra note 10, at 431. "Up until 1964, the South Mrican team was limited to white 
athletes." Id. 
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don apartheid in the sports area. 14S Given the importance of sports in 
South Mrican culture, it is possible that the embarrassment of ostra-
cism contributed to the demise of apartheid in areas beyond sport. 
B. The United States Government's Use of Sports 
The United States has been one of many nations to use interna-
tional sports for political motives. During the 1970s, the United States 
government developed a coherent foreign sports policy which became 
a small part of overall United States foreign policy.146 In 1971, a study 
undertaken for the Nixon Administration recommended that the State 
Department actually develop a program of United States international 
sports activity in order to achieve foreign policy objectives. 147 In fact, 
the United States State Department administered an international 
athletic exchange program for coaches and athletes from 1952 to 1973, 
intended to promote mutual understanding through sport.148 In addi-
tion, the United States boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games to 
protest the Soviet invasion of Mghanistan and other Soviet human 
rights abuses was a dramatic use of sport for political goals. 149 
In summary, throughout the history of the Olympics, governments 
have effectively used sport as a diplomatic tool for political purposes. 
Although most uses of sport to achieve political goals have been ille-
gitimate, good faith efforts to use sport to enhance human rights 
conform with international law and have been justified within the 
United Nations framework. lso Thus, the IOC, the United Nations, and 
many governments historically have accepted the political employment 
of sport to protect human rights. lSI 
V. China's Bid for the 2000 Olympic Games 
A. China's Motives 
In order to analyze the legal propriety of United States opposition 
to China's bid to host the 2000 Olympic Games in terms of customary 
145 Nafziger, Characteristics, supra note 11, at 498. 
146 NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 53. 
147James A.R. Nafziger, Legal Aspects of a United States Foreign Sports Policy, 8 VAND. J. 
T'RANSNAT'L L. 837, 846 (1975) [hereinafter Nafziger, U.S. Sports Policy] (citation omitted). 
148 [d. at 844-45. 
149 See Marks, supra note 26, at 178. The Carter Administration's rationale for the Moscow 
boycott was not clearly enunciated. But there was great uneasiness in Congress over allowing the 
USOC to sponsor a team in Moscow, thereby making a political statement at odds with national 
human rights policies. [d. 
150 NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 99. 
151 See O'Neill, supra note 10, at 431-35. 
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law and historical precedent, it is important first to examine the situ-
ation in China leading to the Beijing bid. The threshold question was, 
did the government of China deserve to be honored by awarding 
Beijing the Millennium Olympic Games, and if so, were China's leaders 
capable of exercising' a due sense of moderation in the humane treat-
ment of the Chinese people during the Games?152 It was difficult to 
answer this question in the affirmative. 
This is how badly China want[ed] to host the 2000 Olympics: 
it dispatched the air force to scatter cloud cover so it wouldn't 
rain on International Olympic Committee (IOC) President 
Juan Antonio Samaranch. It rerouted traffic to ease conges-
tion and shut down factories to reduce poliution for another 
official IOC visit. And it lined up hundreds of "volunteers" 
along the Avenue of Heavenly Peace at midnight to practice 
audience enthusiasm.153 
China's basic motives for desiring to host the Olympic Games were 
based on the typical goal of exhibiting the nation's rich culture on the 
world stage as a means of gaining international prestige. 154 Specifically, 
China's leaders viewed the Olympics as a way to command world 
recognition of China's economic and cultural opportunities and to 
gain domestic acclaim at the turn of the century.155 They also envi-
sioned hosting the Olympics as a way to improve the country's image 
after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre.156 
There was a more fundamental reason that the Chinese leadership 
wanted the Games, however. The real motive was that Beijing believed 
that hosting the prestigious Millennium Olympics would boost the 
Communist Party's image at home and abroad.l57 Such an attempt to 
glorify the Communist political system would fall into the category of 
propaganda, an illegitimate use of international sport.158 
152 Graham Hutchings, Peking Sweep Histury Under IOC Red Carpet, Graham Hutchings on 
How the Events of 1989 Could StiU Ruin China's Bid to Host the 2000 Olympic Games, SUNDAY 
TELEGRAPH, July 11, 1993, at 31. 
153Kari Huus et aI, The Games China Plays, NEWSWEEK, September 27,1993 at 62. 
154 See Nafziger & Strenk, supra note 57, at 273. 
155 Sun, supra note 20, at D1. 
156Id. The Chinese Army violently crushed a student-led pro-democracy demonstration at 
Tiananmen Square, Beijing. More than one thousand unarmed demonstrators and bystanders 
,,:,ere killed and thousands wounded in the Tiananmen Square massacre. Todd, supra note 3, at 
Dl. 
157Hutchings, supra note 152, at 31. 
158 See Nafziger & Strenk, supra note 57, at 273. 
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B. The Human Rights Situation in China 
A brief description of the status of human rights in China is vital 
to this discussion. The United States State Department's 1992 Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices describes repressive practices by the 
Chinese leaders that "fall far short of internationally accepted norms 
•••• "159 The United States Senate resolution opposing China's Olym-
pic bid quotes from the State Department Report that: 
"torture and degrading treatment of detained and impris-
oned persons persisted," ... "conditions in all types of Chi-
nese penal institutions are harsh and frequently degrading, 
... [and the Chinese] government still has not satisfactorily 
accounted for the thousands of persons throughout the coun-
try who were arrested or held in 'detention during the inves-
tigation' or 'administrative detention' status for activities re-
lated to the 1989 pro-democracy demonstrations . . . . "160 
China's record as one of the world's most appalling human rights 
abusers even arose in connection with China's own presentation to the 
Olympic site selection committee. The official Chinese Olympic bid 
touted China's ability to suppress dissent as an asset. It contained an 
offer that: "Neither now, nor in the future, will there emerge ... 
organizations opposing Beijing's bid .... "161 Chinese authorities prom-
ised to institute a comprehensive surveillance program in 1998 to 
"guard 'against any possible hazard to the Games' in which 'suspects' 
would be put under surveillance and control. "162 Such a promise to 
suppress any citizen who would not follow the government on the 
Olympic issue injected, in a very offensive tone, a human rights ele-
ment into the bidding.163 The government seemed ready and willing 
to resort to drastic and brutal means to make good on its promise that 
demonstrations would not mar the Games. IM There were reports that 
Chinese authorities jailed without trial several dissidents who tried to 
persuade the IOC not to award the Games to Beijing.165 Perhaps the 
159S. Res. 124, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (quoting STATE DEPARTMENT'S COUNTRY RE-
PORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, S. Doc. No. 382, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993». 
160S. Res. 117, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
161 Hutchings, supra note 152, at 31. 
162Todd, supra note 3, at DI. 
163 See id. 
164 Roughton, supra note I, at AI. 
165Todd, supra note 3, at DI. The following story confirmed the suspicions of many oppo-
nents to the Beijing Olympic bid who feared that China's leaders were putting on a charade of 
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most telling fact regarding China's bid is that the chairman of the 
Beijing Olympics bid committee was Mayor Chen Xitong, the same 
Communist Party official who signed the martial law decree to smash 
the pro-democracy demonstration in Tiananmen Square on June 3-4, 
1989.166 
C. Arguments In Favor of Granting China Host Status 
In spite of the human rights problems, there is some merit to 
arguments that China's staging the Olympics would serve to establish 
international goodwill and would confer other benefits upon China 
and the world.167 Chen Xitong's Olympic committee stated the argu-
ment best when it said, ''We hope to combine the Olympic spirit with 
5000 years' civilization of China. While carrying out reforms and open-
ing to the outside world, China hopes to expand its exchanges with 
other countries to enhance mutual understanding and harmony be-
tween Eastern and Western cultures. "168 Supporters of the bid said that 
a Beijing Olympiad would boost China's economic reforms, raise na-
tional pride, and open the nation to the world. 169 They also argued that 
the Chinese people would benefit from infrastructure improvements 
and from huge business opportunities that the Olympics would pre-
sent.170 Also, some believed that holding the Games in a country known 
for human rights abuses would be one way to accelerate its respect for 
human rights concessions leading up to the IOC site selection decision, and were not sincere 
about legitimate improvement: 
BEIJING - In a sign that authorities are cracking down again following Beijing's 
losing bid for the 2000 Olympic Games, two Shanghai dissidents were tried in secret 
the day after the decision to award the games to Sydney. The two, Yao Kaiwen and 
Gao Xiaoliang, were charged with "forming a counterrevolutionary clique," and a 
secret hearing was held on Sept. 24, their friend Han Lifa said in a phone interview 
from Shanghai yesterday. The trial apparently was delayed pending the Olympic 
award, which went to Sydney. (AP) 
New Trials Follow Failed China Bid, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 19, 1993, at 10. 
166Todd, supra note 3, at Dl. 
167 See Ian MacLeod, Blunders That May Lose China the 2000 Games, S. CHINA MORNING POST, 
June 20, 1993, at 8. 
168Todd, supra note 3, at Dl. Although this statement effectively encapsulates the "interna-
tional harmony" argument, the underlying motives of the Chinese leadership are probably more 
focused on cleaning up its world image in the wake of the Tiananmen massacre. See Richard 
Dicker, Human Rights Would Lose in a Beijing Olympiad, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 23,1993; see 
also supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text 
169 John Kohut, Public's Fear of Paying for Games Restrains Enthusiasm; Mixed Hopes for Bid, 
S. CHINA MORNING PosT,July 12,1993, at 8. IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch argues that 
the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul helped to change South Korea, another developing country, 
into a fully democratic economic power. MacLeod, supra note 167, at 8. 
170 Kohut, supra note 169, at 8. 
1995] OLYMPIC SITE SELECTION 163 
human rights-the "Olympic constructive engagement" approach. l7l 
The proponents of this approach acknowledged the human rights 
abuses but concluded that it was worth taking a chance that the pros-
pect of praise for a successful Olympics would encourage the regime 
to improve human rights conditions. 172 
D. Arguments Opposing the Chinese Olympic Bid 
1. An Undeserved Stamp of Approval 
Though there may have been some plausible points in favor of 
Beijing, it surely would have been odd, by any standard, to award the 
Olympics to a city whose leaders had killed hundreds of their own 
unarmed citizens while they were campaigning for more democracy 
only four years ago. I73 It is more likely that the Games would have 
legitimized the Chinese government and its policies by sending the 
signal that their human rights practices were acceptable and that the 
international community has forgotten, or forgiven, Tiananmen. 174 
Holding the Olympics in China, while the government routinely im-
prisons and tortures peaceful political dissidents, would have conferred 
upon China's leaders a "stamp of approval which they clearly do not 
deserve," wrote Senator Bill BradleyI75 in a letter to IOC President 
Samaranch in June, 1993.176 Thus, the Olympic constructive engage-
ment approach fails under scrutiny because even if awarding the 
Games to Beijing would have promoted greater economic openness, it 
would also have provided a stamp of approval for China's offensive 
human rights policies.177 Historical precedent justifies this reasoning. 
Human rights groups observe that there was no increased respect for 
human rights in Mexico after the 1968 Games, nor in the Soviet Union 
after the 1980 Games. 178 In addition, the benefits that ostensibly would 
171 See Dicker, supra note 168. 
172 Id. 
173 Hutchings, supra note 152, at 31. The opening session of the 2000 Olympic Games would 
have been in the Great Hall of the People in Tiananmen Square, where the Chinese army killed 
hundreds of students in the 1989 pro-democracy protest. Lloyd, supra note 36, at 12C. 
174 Dicker, supra note 168. An lOC award of a Beijing 2000 Olympiad would have sent a 
message that the world no longer holds the government accountable for its actions, thereby giving 
China the " ... wholly undeserved 'acceptance' it urgently seeks." Id. 
175 Senator Bradley was captain of the gold medal winning United States Olympic basketball 
team in the 1964 Tokyo Games, and is one of the sponsors of the United States Senate resolution 
that opposed China's Olympic bid. See Sun, supra note 20, at D1. 
176Id. 
177 Dicker, supra note 168. 
178 Sun, supra note 20, at D 1. 
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have accrued to the Chinese people would have been offset by costly 
"contributions" automatically deducted from their paychecks if the 
government repeated the practice of the Asian Games that were held 
in China in 1990.179 
2. Comparison of China and the Former Soviet Union 
Similarities exist between today's China and the former Soviet 
Union with respect to governmental attitudes toward international 
sport. The Soviets viewed success in an athletic contest against an 
adversary as a victory for the Soviet Government and a means of widely 
publicizing the Communist ideology. ISO This view is contrary to the 
Olympic ideals and is also a possible violation of international sports 
law and custom. lSI The Chinese leaders, operating under a similar 
obsession to promote their Communist political ideology, also use 
international sport for improper propaganda purposes.IS2 It is enlight-
ening that the Soviet Union equated its success in receiving host-nation 
status of the 1980 Summer Games with a political success in world recog-
nition. The Soviet Union viewed its award by the IOC of host-nation 
status as an endorsement of Soviet policy.ls3 Had China received the 
same mistaken impression as a result of being awarded the 2000 Olym-
pics, the IOC would have lent legitimacy to China's human rights policies. 
3. Symbolic Impact of the Millennium Olympic Games 
The considerable symbolic impact of the Millennium Olympic 
Games would have magnified the impression of world endorsement of 
Chinese human rights practices, particularly given the worldwide me-
dia exposure. Such a major event taking place at the turn of the 
millennium would have resulted in exaggerated symbolic impact of the 
Olympic site award. The United States Senate resolution stated: "Re-
warding China with the Olympic games would be the worst possible 
way to greet the beginning of the Third Millennium. "IS4 
179Id. The Chinese government imposed a tax to finance the Asian Games. Residents of 
Beijing believed that this practice would have been repeated to finance a Beijing Olympiad. Id. 
18oO'Neill, supra note 10, at 427 n.l67. 
181Id. Rule 9 of the Olympic Charter states that the Olympic Games are between individuals 
and not countries. OLYMPIC CHARTER art. I, rule 9. 
182William Safire, Games Asians Play, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1990, at A21. Safire comments: 
''To Americans, politics is sport; to Asians, sport is politics. Beijing's authorities [were] using this 
event [the Asian Games] to assert their regional prestige, to unifY their nation behind the goal 
of winning gold medals, and to expunge the memory of ... 'events' at Tiananmen." 
1830'Neill, supra note 10, at 413 n.75. 
184S. Res. 117, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
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Awarding the 2000 Olympic Games to China would have consti-
tuted an undeserved endorsement of Chinese human rights policies 
and would have reduced any impetus China might have had to discon-
tinue its repressive practices. Awarding the 2000 Olympics to Beijing 
would have squandered the international community's chance to press 
for substantive human rights improvements. China's government 
should demonstrate respect for the most basic and universal norms of 
human rights before the IOC bestows upon it the privilege of hosting 
the Olympic Games.185 
VI. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR UNITED STATES OPPOSITION TO CHINA 
HOSTING THE OLYMPIC GAMES 
A The Legal Issue 
In analyzing the legitimacy of United States OpposItIOn to the 
Beijing 2000 Olympic bid from the perspective ofinternationallaw and 
historical precedent, it is important to remember that, for better or for 
worse, international politics and sports have always been inseparable.186 
The United States and the world must work within the existing political 
context in evaluating the propriety of a nation-state's opposition to any 
Olympic bid.187 It has been established that political uses of sport can 
be legitimate or illegitimate depending on the motive. 188 Given the 
premise that the Chinese do not deserve to host the Olympic Games 
because China's leaders are responsible for human rights abuses and 
because they may be using the Games for illegitimate propaganda 
purposes, the issue becomes a question of law. Although United States 
opposition was acceptable according to historical precedent as a legiti-
mate use of sport to enhance human rights, was such action prohibited 
by domestic or international sports law? 
B The United States Congressional Resolutions 
The United States Congressional resolutions of 1993 relating to 
the siting of the Olympics in the year 2000 were simply an expression 
of the United States Congress' desire and did not constitute legal 
185Dicker, supra note 168. 
186 See supra Part IV. 
187 Espy, supra note 38, at 171. "Too much evidence exists showing that sport and politics 
are indeed inseparable. This must be recognized and accepted if one is to deal with the numerous 
problems facing the Olympics. To deny the obvious is to court ruin." Id. 
188 See supra Part IV. 
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authority in and of themselves. 189 The resolutions were not even con-
sidered voting instructions for the American delegate to the IOC, 
much less an order to the IOC as a whole. 190 They were a sign of 
American displeasure at China's disregard for international opinion 
about its humanitarian practices. l9l 
C Domestic United States Law: The Amateur Sports Act 
There are no authoritative restraints under United States law on 
United States Government involvement in international sports to fur-
ther a foreign policy objective.192 As a matter of domestic law, the 
President may employ amateur athletics as a tool of foreign policy 
under the foreign relations powers of the United States Constitution 193 
or under delegated Congressional authority.194 Generally, the Amateur 
Sports Act of 1978 defines the government's policy options. 195 
The Amateur Sports Act of 1978 provides that the USOC, not the 
Federal Government, governs the conduct of amateur athletics within 
this country.196 However, as discussed in Part III of this Note, the Act 
cannot constrain the Federal Government from exercising otherwise 
legitimate powers such as the foreign relations power. Thus, because 
the Act is primarily intended to govern domestic sports activity and 
there is no express prohibition against using the power of sports to 
achieve foreign policy goals, the Federal Government has authority 
under United States law to attempt to influence IOC decisions regard-
ing Olympic site selection. 
Some commentators argue that the legislative history of the Act 
demonstrates a Congressional intention to divorce sports from foreign 
policy. 197 An amendment to the bill offered by Congressman Robert F. 
Drinan would have prohibited the use of Government funds in support 
of "United States participation in amateur athletic events in nations 
189 A resolution by definition is not law but is simply a form in which a legislative body 
expresses an opinion. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1310 (6th ed. 1990). 
190 Rule 12 of the Olympic Charter states that members of the IOC may not accept instruc-
tions from their governments. OLYMPIC CHARTER art. I, rule 12. Anita DeFrantz, the sole Ameri-
can member of the IOC, stated with regard to the U.S. resolutions: "It's kind of them to offer 
their thoughts to me. I'll make my own decision." Roughton, supra note 1, at AI. 
191 IOC Defies Leader's Logic, S. CHINA MORNING PosT,June 22, 1993. 
192 See Nafziger, u.s. Sports Policy, supra note 147, at 845. 
193U.S. CaNsT. art. II, §§ 1-3. 
194 NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 63. 
195 Id. 
196Marks, supra note 26, at 164-65. 
197 Id. at 177. 
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which consistently engage in gross violations of human rights."19s Some 
argued that defeat of the Drinan amendment meant that Congress 
adopted the view that it would be inappropriate for the Government 
to use sports even to enhance world humanitarian conditions.199 How-
ever, this interpretation lacks merit because when the bill reached the 
floor, there was great uneasiness during debate about allowing an 
independent USOC to sponsor a team in Moscow, thereby making a 
political statement at odds with international human rights stand-
ards.20o In short, the Amateur Sports Act has nothing to do with how 
politics and the Olympics mix.201 
D. International Sports Law 
1. The Olympic Charter 
Given that United States domestic law permits the political use of 
international sport, it is now necessary to focus on international law to 
examine further the propriety of United States opposition to China's 
Olympic bid. As explained in Part III of this Note, the Rules of the 
Olympic Charter best embody the custom of international sports law 
and the actions of nation-states with regard to the Chinese situation. 
The Olympic Charter describes the aims of the Olympic Movement as 
essentially the pursuit of a better and more peaceful world.202 To award 
host status of the prestigious Millennium Olympics to such a notorious 
human rights abuser as China would have been in contravention of 
the customary law of the Olympic Charter, because it might have 
served to perpetuate human rights abuses that are starkly inconsistent 
with the Olympic ideapo3 
198Id. 
199Id. It appeared that by defeating the Drinan amendment, Congress adopted the argument 
of shotputter Al Feuerbach. "Feuerbach felt that participation in the Olympics would not be 
unpatriotic and that 'competing in a large meeting of individuals from many nations from all 
over the world expands the possibilities of peace and understanding, and is a patriotic act.'" Id. 
200Id. at 178. 
20IId. Although Congressman Jack Kemp "had been trying to persuade the USOC to act 
within the international Olympic movement to have the Games moved from Moscow, he empha-
sized that the Amateur Sports Act 'has nothing to do with the 1980 Olympic games, except to 
facilitate the preparation of the American athletes for participation in those games .... '" Id. 
202 OLYMPIC CHARTER art. I, rule 1. 
203 The present state of human rights in China features arbitrary arrest and detention, forced 
labor, religious persecution, and prison torture. Such conditions violate minimum standards of 
human rights under customary international law. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, The United 
States-China Act of 1991 and Customary International Law, 13 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 257, 279-80 
(1993) . 
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It would have exceeded international legal bounds for the IOC, 
an organization that professes high moral standards, to award the 
Olympic Games to a country with a human rights record as egregious 
as China's.20410C members are supposed to be "ambassadors of the 
Olympic ideal."205 If a prospective site nation does not live up to the 
standards of the Olympic ideal, as China does not, then IOC members 
should be consistent with their mission and vote against that nation. 
Thus, for the United States to urge that IOC members vote against 
China on human rights grounds was for the United States to urge that 
the IOC members fulfill their legitimate obligations, which are justified 
by the Olympic Charter under international law. 
The Chinese argued that United States opposition to China's 
Olympic bid is political interference with sport that was itself a viola-
tion of the Olympic Charter.206 But a nation-state's use of sports for 
human rights motives is distinguishable legally, as well as historically,207 
from a strictly political motive. "[A]s a matter of textual interpretation, 
the validity of political intervention in sports is generally acceptable 
when it furthers specific provisions of international law, but may be 
unacceptable when it does not. "208 Under international law, actions by 
nation-states to combat human rights abuses are valid, whereas geopoli-
tically motivated actions must be evaluated individually. Thus, United 
States action to combat human rights abuses in China is valid under 
international human rights law, and is therefore legal under interna-
tional sports law when the motive is truly human rights oriented and 
not wholly politically motivated.209 
2. Boycott Analogy 
Opposition to a nation's bid for host status is similar to an inter-
national boycott in the sense that nations do not want to send their 
athletes to a certain country for some foreign policy reason. A boycott 
is not exactly the same as the China bid situation in that boycotts occur 
204 Roughton, supra note I, at AI. 
205 O'Neill, supra note 10, at 407. 
206 See Roughton, supra note I, at AI. The Chinese Olympic Committee criticized the United 
States Congressional resolutions as "wanton interference with the just right of the Chinese 
people" and claimed that the resolutions "trample upon Olympic principles." ld. Rule 3 of the 
Olympic Charter prohibits discrimination against a country based on political grounds. OLYMPIC 
CHARTER art. I, rule 3. Rule 9 states that the Games are not intended as contests between 
countries, but between individuals. OLYMPIC CHARTER art. I, rule 9. 
207 See supra Part lV. 
208 NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 65. 
209 See id. at 117. 
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after the award of host status, but the legal rationale for boycotts 
nevertheless has some application here. 
In general, a boycott is contrary to the Olympic Charter because 
it is a form of political interference by means of sport. It is particularly 
offensive because by its nature it denies athletes their right to com-
pete.210 A substantial body of international law and custom, however, 
shows that where fundamental human rights principles outweigh the 
right to participate in international sport, a boycott of the offending 
nation is not only legitimate but also is sanctioned by United Nations 
authority.211 Boycotts intended to combat human rights abuses are 
given additional legitimacy if they seek to vindicate a nearly universal 
consensus of the world community, as expressed by national resolu-
tions or by United Nations pronouncements.212 The main criticism of 
boycotts is not that they are illegal or ineffective but that they deprive 
athletes of the chance to compete.213 The right to compete is not 
applicable to the China situation because all athletes, including the 
Chinese, will still get to compete in Sydney, Australia.214 Thus, when 
the United States action is motivated by human rights conditions, it 
cannot be invalidated under international sports law as akin to an 
illegal sports boycott, especially if it is sanctioned by international 
human rights law.2J5 
210 See Marks, supra note 26, at ISO. 
211 O'Neill, supra note 10, at 432. This was the case concerning South Mrica and its apartheid 
policies. NAFZIGER, supra note S, at S1. 
212 NAFZIGER, supra note S, at 117. 
213 See Marks, supra note 26, at ISO. 
214 There was no suggestion by the United States that it would have boycotted the 2000 Games 
if Beijing had won the award. 
215There is a common perception that it was hypocritical for the United States to oppose 
the Chinese Olympic bid while offering China Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status. Bert 
RoughtonJr., The Atlanta Olympics, U.S. OPPosition to Beijing Risky, IOC Official Says Could Lead 
to Baycott of '96 Games, ATLANTA]. AND CONST., June 23, 1993, at C3. IOC Vice President Kevin 
Gosper noted: "It sounds as if the U.S. government is talking with two voices--one on trade and 
one on the Olympics." Id. Should the United States bring its economic and trading power to bear 
as well as its sports leverage in the battle against human rights abuses? With China's MFN status 
renewed for another year, the edge may be taken off United States sports action against China's 
humanitarian record. MacLeod, supra note 167, at S. The answer to this apparent paradox may 
lie in the premise that the United States economic stake in China is far larger than its sporting 
stake. There is $6 billion worth of United States investment in China, and 300 major United States 
companies sent letters to President Bill Clinton asking him not to withdraw MFN. Id. Also, the 
Olympic Games, unlike MFN, cannot be awarded on a conditional basis. Id. MFN can still be 
cancelled if the United States wants to send an even stronger and clearer signal to China that its 
human rights practices need to be brought up to acceptable standards. However, regardless of 
the economic stake and conditional nature of MFN, the Clinton Administration's choice of an 
MFN posture inconsistent with Congressional resolutions opposing the Chinese Olympic bid 
placed the United States foreign policy position squarely in the middle on this important human 
rights matter. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
An international legal framework exists within which the IOC 
applies its authority to settle disputes when international politics clash 
with the Olympic Games. Historical precedents of the world commu-
nity using sports to protest human rights abuses contribute to the 
establishment of legal custom within this international framework. 
Such sports pressure is warranted because China probably would have 
misinterpreted an uncontested Olympic award as world acceptance of 
its poor human rights record. The government of China is particularly 
vulnerable to international sports pressure because, like South Mrica, 
it places enormous importance on international sports competition 
and specifically on the Olympic Games. United States opposition to 
China's Olympic 2000 bid, as expressed by Congressional resolutions, 
was justified in that it followed the custom of international sports law 
of permitting the political use of sport to enhance human rights. 
The Beijing 2000 controversy provided a lesson for the handling 
of future political and human rights conflicts in sports. To the extent 
that sport is important to the international relations policies of any 
nation, an attempt to persuade the IOC to deny a bid to host the 
Olympic Games can be legitimately and effectively used as a weapon 
against that nation's abuse of human rights. 
